Part 19 (1/2)
[Footnote 158: Ibid., p. 90.]
”A dream. An old German dream. A land full of quaintness which the rush of modern life has left untouched. On all sides cleanliness and order which makes the heart beat gladly. And this joyful impression is doubly strong when one comes direct from the dirty, disorderly villages of the Walloons.
”Just as a mother may give birth to two children with entirely different natures, so Belgium affords hearth and home to two peoples in whose language, culture and customs there is neither similarity nor harmony.
The Flemings are absolutely German, and in this war they treat us with friendly confidence. Their eyes do not glitter with fanatical hate like those of the Walloons.”[159]
[Footnote 159: Heinrich Binder: ”Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen,” p.
102.]
Herr Binder's meditations on the slaughter in the valley of the Meuse are not without interest. ”A vale which has been won by German blood! In recent days the waters of the Meuse have often flowed blood-red. Many a warrior has sunk into these depths. Longing and hope rise in our hearts: May destiny determine that all these dead, after a triumphant war, shall sleep at rest in a German valley!”[160]
[Footnote 160: Ibid., p. 122.]
CHAPTER X
SAIGNER a BLANC.[161]
[Footnote 161: ”To bleed white.” Bismarck employed this phrase on two occasions in addressing the Reichstag; his purpose could have been no other than to bully France.--Author.]
It would be superfluous to review here the history of Franco-German relations during the last half century; other writers have already performed the task. Yet the whole trend of development in the relations between the two powerful neighbours may be defined by two watch-words: _saigner a blanc_ in Germany, and the _revanche idee_ in France. But there is this difference: the former has become ever more and more, and the latter less and less, a factor in European politics.
While the German nation has been gradually and systematically leavened with the teaching that might alone is right, the French revenge party has been weakened year by year by national prosperity, colonial expansion and the growth of a powerful anti-military party. Whatever may be said of French chauvinists, this much remains an immovable fact--the party was incapable of providing adequate national defences against the Germanic neighbour, while plans of reconquest can only be a.s.signed to the domain of myths.
On every occasion that the _revanche_ cry has been resuscitated, the direct cause is to be sought in Germany. Having displaced France in 1870 from her position of the first military power in Europe, Germany has endeavoured by fair and foul means to prevent her neighbour from again raising her head, and that policy alone is to blame for the suspicion and hatred which have marked Franco-German relations during the whole period and plunged Europe into an era of armaments, ending in a world war. England and Russia prevented Bismarck from annihilating France in 1875, an incident which aroused justified fear throughout France and gave an impulse to the revenge party.
In 1881 the Iron Chancellor told the French Amba.s.sador: ”Outside Europe you can do what you like.” Bismarck's intention was to divert reviving French energies to colonial work, and if possible involve her in conflicts with the other Colonizing Powers. In both of these plans he succeeded, but the common sense and loyalty of Great Britain and Italy prevented the conflicts from a.s.suming a dangerous form--war--as desired by the Government in Berlin.
As soon as the latter perceived that French genius and persistency were bearing fruit in a magnificent colonial empire, the innate jealousy and greed of the German nation led to a policy of colonial pinp.r.i.c.ks on the part of the Kaiser's Government. This seems the most probable explanation of Germany's att.i.tude during the last decade before 1914.
The natural consequence was that those powers which had most to fear through German ill-will were welded together more firmly in a policy of self-protection.
Germany cannot, or will not, recognize that the causes of the above-mentioned development are to be found solely and alone in her own actions. On the contrary, she designates the ”consequences” a world-wide conspiracy against German interests. In naval affairs she adopts the same nave line of argument. First and foremost Germany committed herself to a policy of unlimited--even provocative--naval expansion.
When the Power most concerned--Great Britain--took precautionary measures to guarantee British interests in view of Germany's ”peaceful”
development, then the latter Power declared the consequences of her own actions to be a hostile initiative directed against her.
A defence of this kind may be convincing for those who observe events in the German perspective, but it will be unable to withstand impartial historical criticism. Boxers expect a rebound when they ”punch the ball,” but none of them would be so foolish as to deny having delivered a blow when the rebound takes place. Yet that is the unscientific defence which Germany has adopted in her endeavours to explain away her aggressive att.i.tude to Belgium, France, and Great Britain.
In a word, the principles underlying _saigner a blanc_ have grown during the past four decades into a possible avalanche possessing huge potential energy; the momentum was given to it in August, 1914.
If it were necessary, a picture of German popular opinion might be projected, showing how that opinion was influenced and formed during the critical days at the close of July last year. But from considerations of s.p.a.ce only the outlines of the picture can be given. Before the war German newspapers abounded in reports of French unpreparedness and chaos. The German public was informed that France dreaded and feared war with Germany.
”Without any exaggeration it may be said that a state of nerves has seized the French nation, such as we should seek for in vain at the time of Tangiers and Agadir. There is tremendous excitement, which in many reports suggests absolute panic.”[162]
[Footnote 162: _Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten_, August 1st.]
The Paris correspondent of the _Kolnische Zeitung_ (August 4th) on returning to Cologne wrote: ”Conditions in France afford a striking picture of bad organization. War rage possesses the people; but such an enthusiasm as I found in Germany on my return is unknown to them.”
On the same day the _Hamburger Nachrichten_ reported: ”A German refugee who has returned from the French capital says that there is no enthusiasm in Paris. Men and women may be seen weeping in the streets, while the crowds are shouting: 'Down with war!' 'We desire no war!'”
Probably there is no better way to incite a ferocious bully than to tell him that his opponent is weak, unprepared and afraid. Almost simultaneously false reports of French troops crossing the frontier and of French airmen dropping bombs on Nuremberg were spread by the Berlin General Staff, and thus an excuse found for a declaration of war on France.